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Abstract. In recent years, there has been a sharp growth in both the magnitude and 
frequency of major infrastructure investments worldwide. Despite this boom in 
infrastructure spending, major projects continue to systematically underperform, as 
demonstrated in numerous empirical studies. In this paper, the author will discuss the 
factors underlying this growth in public spending, evaluate the empirical evidence on 
project cost overruns, and discuss the broader macroeconomic implications of this 
phenomenon. 
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1. Introduction 
cross the political spectrum, politicians have advocated for 
sprawling infrastructure spending plans, citing millions of 
purportedly ‚shovel-ready‛ jobs and positive impacts on economic 
growth. This phenomenon is a global one, as evident in the growth in the 
magnitude and frequency of government megaprojects over the last several 
decades. Far from driving meaningful economic growth, these schemes 
systematically underperform, undermining project viability in many 
instances. 
Government projects are rarely evaluated on a comprehensive cost-
benefit analysis basis; ex-ante evaluations are distorted by bureaucratic 
incentives, resulting in systematic cost and schedule overruns across 
project types and geographies. Comprehensive ex-post cost benefit analysis 
over an extended period after initial financing is not common practice 
among government agencies, although there are several prominent 
academic studies that have conducted such analyses. While benefits 
provided by public works are often difficult to directly ascertain, as 
network and spillover effects are frequently given arbitrary or inflated 
valuations, the costs side of the equation is the source of rampant waste 
and inefficiency by project promoters. The rule of thumb known as the 
‚bureaucratic rule of 2‛ aptly describes the current state of government 
project management: to roughly determine the cost of a government 
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provision, simply find the equivalent cost in the private sector and double 
it. 
In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, there has 
emerged a commonly held notion that countercyclical monetary policy has 
run out of ammunition with interest rates at or near the zero lower bound, 
which has driven policy-makers to pursue heightened fiscal spending. This 
new paradigm has given rise to so-called Monetary Theory (MMT), a 
doctrine embraced by many figures on the progressive left. The theory 
states that fiscal deficits are irrelevant, given the assumption that 
governments can borrow in their own currencies and effectively keep 
inflation in check. Moreover, it serves as a justification for more 
government spending. Another implication of MMT is that fiscal policy 
should serve as the primary macroeconomic policy lever, rather than 
monetary policy. Proponents of this view fail to consider the fact that while 
economic dynamics have changed, monetary policy has not been rendered 
impotent. In fact, monetary policy ‚invariably dominates‛ when monetary 
and fiscal policies act in opposite directions (Greenwood, 2019). Rather 
than interest rates, the key element of monetary policy is maintaining the 
level of broad money in the economy.  
As governments spend increasingly large amounts of money on 
increasingly large-scale projects, infrastructure has become a major flash 
point when it comes to questions of public spending. The below discussion 
focuses on the costs side of cost-benefit analysis and assesses the 
prevalence and implications of pervasive cost overruns across various 
government projects, both in the United States and worldwide.   
 
2. Cost overruns in the United States 
2.1. Historical project performance 
Cost overruns have pervaded the federal government for centuries. 
According to a study conducted by economists Stanley Engerman and 
Kenneth Sokoloff, the vast majority of infrastructure projects throughout 
US history have had substantial cost overruns (Edwards & Kaeding, 2015). 
A notable example is the construction of the Erie Canal between 1817 and 
1825; the initial construction went 46% over budget, and the canal’s 
subsequent expansion went 142% over budget. Also, the Panama Canal’s 
construction between 1902 to 1913 went 106% over budget. More recently, 
the cost to develop the ‚Healthcare.gov‛ website launched in 2013 
ballooned from $464 million to $824 million (Edwards & Kaeding, 2015). 
Private sector investments are governed by a system of profit and loss, 
as illustrated by Ludwig von Mises: 
‚In the capitalist system of society’s economic organization, the 
entrepreneurs determine the course of production. In the performance of 
this function they are unconditionally and totally subject to the sovereignty 
of the buying public, the consumers. If they fail to produce in the cheapest 
and best possible way those commodities which the consumers are asking 
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for most urgently, they suffer losses and are finally eliminated from their 
entrepreneurial position.‛ (Mises, 1951). 
 Government decisions are instead implemented largely on the basis of 
political and bureaucratic interests and heavily skewed projections of costs 
and benefits. Historically, public investments in the US have primarily 
relied on such ex-ante benefit-cost analyses, which are especially 
handicapped in the absence of a comprehensive ex-post review of the actual 
economic performance of such projects – a requirement in the private sector 
to ensure profitability and efficiency.  
In 1972, economist Robert Haveman conducted one of the first 
systematic efforts to assess actual government project performance. 
Haveman undertook an ‚exploratory effort‛ to determine how ex-post 
analysis can better inform and shape ex-ante forecasts for public projects, 
using various water resource investments as case studies. In what he 
characterizes as a ‚pilot study,‛ Haveman deals with numerous aspects of 
the planning process for water resource investments (Haveman, 1972). 
Haveman’s study was unique in that it examined realized project 
benefits, in addition to costs. Major topics of study include ex-post 
evaluations of flood control projects, navigation facilities investments, 
hydroelectric projects, and cost estimation experience. In conclusion, 
Haveman found that standard ex-ante estimations of project benefits are 
seriously flawedacross the board. In an ex-post investigation of one flood 
control project, Haveman found that realized economic benefits 
considerably fell short of official estimates cited in the Corps of Engineers’ 
ex-ante project report. Additionally, the chapters addressing navigation 
improvements challenge various ex-ante procedures for appraising 
projected benefits, concluding upon revaluation that per unit benefits were 
initially inflated. Haveman found that benefits were significantly 
overstated in his evaluation of hydroelectric projects as well, citing major 
shortfalls in the ex-ante review, including a failure to incorporate factors, 
such as changing technology, in the analysis of least-cost alternatives. On 
the cost side of the equation, Haveman’ sex-post assessment of 86 Corps of 
Engineers projects examined cost estimation performance and found 
considerable variance between estimates and actual costs. While the study 
was relatively small in scope, Haveman’s work provided an important first 
step in project evaluation literature and highlighted the importance of 
comprehensive ex-post analyses. 
In a 1973 study, economist Leonard Merewitz examined past cost 
overrun experiences and also concluded that large public works projects, 
over the last two centuries, have had a history of enormous cost overruns, 
and this phenomenon has been observed repeatedly in subsequent analyses 
(Merewitz, 1973). Merewitz found that costs for larger projects are more 
difficult to manage than smaller projects. Also, the longer a project 
continues, the greater the likelihood of cost overruns. Even after adjusting 
for inflation and changes to project scope throughout the planning process, 
delays and cost escalation tend to go hand in hand (Merewitz, 1973). Cost 
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overruns are particularly problematic when projects’ benefit-cost analysis 
and decision making processes were predicated on a cost estimate that was 
later determined to be inaccurate.  
While certain exogenous causes of cost overrun, including unexpected 
inflation, technological problems, and unforeseen changes to project scope, 
are uncontrollable, poor administration is an important driving factor. 
Engineering, financial, and legal concerns can often be anticipated and 
appropriately factored into estimates. But, overly complex organizational 
structures, poor contracting practices, unnecessary changes to project 
scope, and inexperienced personnel can compound difficulties in project 
management and cost estimating (Merewitz, 1973). 
Merewitz reviewed cost performance across project types to discern 
patterns of cost overruns. As shown in Table 1, Merewitz observed that cost 
overruns are most seriously underestimated in ad hoc public works projects, 
followed by building, and likely rapid transit projects. 
 
Table 1. Summary of Cost Estimation Experience – Merewitz (1973) 
Type of project Number of projects Mean ratio=Actual/Estimate 
Water resource 49 1.39 
Highway 49 1.26 
Building 59 1.63 
Rapid Transit 8 1.51 
Ad Hoc 15 2.11 
Total 180 1.50 
Source: Merewitz, L. (1972). Prepared by Alexandria Edwards, the Johns Hopkins 
University. 
 
Time and time again, cost overruns are standard across government 
projects. Major areas of federal waste include defense, energy, and 
transport projects, which are discussed in further detail below.  
 
2.2. Transportation 
A pattern of cost overruns in publicly funded transportation projects 
dates back centuries. While proponents of government spending often 
point to the aforementioned Erie Canal as a success, the project spurred the 
development of a ‚slew of government boondoggles,‛ as state 
governments rushed to spend excessively on their own canal schemes, 
often overestimating demand and underestimating costs (Merewitz, 1973). 
Furthermore, routes were largely determined on the basis of political 
interests rather than economic benefits, resulting in large taxpayer losses. 
Today’s urban rail schemes are analogous and constitute a major 
component of government infrastructure spending, and they are frequently 
subject to cost overruns and inflated ridership projections. In a 1990 report 
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by the Department of Transportation, nine of the ten projects examined had 
cost overruns, with an average overrun of 50 percent (Pickrell, 1990).  This 
trend has been replicated in numerous other studies and appears to be an 
international phenomenon. 
A notable example is Boston’s Central Artery tunnel, commonly known 
as the ‚Big Dig,‛ which incurred over $12 billion in cost overrun and was 
constructed over a period of 25 years, from 1982 through 2007.2Table 2 
provides a sampling of major American transportation infrastructure 
projects and associated cost overruns. 
 
Table 2. Sampling of transportation cost overruns 
Transportation Projects 
  
Cost Estimate and Date of Estimate 
Original   Recent or Final Cost Overrun 
Boston Big Dig $2.6b (1985)   $14.6b (2005) $12b 
New York City East Side Access $4.3b (1999)   $10.8b (2014) $6.5b 
San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge $1.4b (1996)   $6.3b (2013) $4.9b 
Denver International Airport $1.7b (1989)   $4.8b (1995) $3.1b 
New York City WTC Rail Station $2.0b (2004)   $4.0b (2015) $2.0b 
Denver West Light Rail $250m (1997)   $707m (2013) $457m 
Virginia Springfield interchange $241m (1994)   $676m (2003) $435m 
Source: Edwards, & Kaeding, (2015). Prepared by Alexandria Edwards, the Johns Hopkins University. 
 
2.3. Defense 
The Department of Defense (DoD) is widely known forits history ofcost 
overruns on procurements of weapons and equipment. Former 
Comptroller General David Walker has characterized the Pentagon as 
having ‚a long-standing track record of over-promising and under-
delivering with virtual impunity.‛ (Pickrell, 1990). Numerous reports 
conducted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have found 
consistent cost escalations, and a 2014 GAO report stated that ‚weapon 
systems acquisition has been on GAO’s high risk list since 1990.‛ 
The GAO monitors estimated costs of major weapons programs and has 
found that typical cost overrun percentage has not fallen over time; of the 
91 programs examined in 2005, R&D costs were 33 percent overbudget, on 
average, and procurement costs were 18 percent overbudget. Additionally, 
for the 78 programs examined in 2014, R&D costs were 53 percent 
overbudget, on average, and procurement costs were 46 percent 
overbudget (Pickrell, 1990). 
Moreover, the GAO has also noted that while private companies account 
for investment spending as a cost to be controlled, in the DoD, ‚new 
products in the form of budget line items can represent revenue. An agency 
may be able to justify a larger budget if it can win approval for more 
programs. Thus, weapon system programs can be viewed both as 
expenditures and revenue generators.‛ (Pickrell, 1990). 
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Table 3. Sampling of defense cost overruns 
Defense Projects 
  
Per-Unit Cost Estimate and Date of Estimate 
Original   Recent/Final Cost Overrun 
Littoral Combat Ship $360m (2004)   $667m (2014) $307m 
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle $102m (1998)   $376m (2013) $274m 
Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) $79m (2001)   $138m (2013) $59m 
JPALS Landing System $29m (2008)   $77m (2014) $48m 
G/ATOR Radar $24m (2005)   $61m (2014) $37m 
Source: Edwards, & Kaeding, (2015). Prepared by Alexandria Edwards, the Johns Hopkins University. 
 
2.4. Energy  
Since the founding of the Department of Energy, its projects have 
experienced significant cost overruns. The largest part of the agency’s 
budget is allocated to the National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA), which manages the security of America’s nuclear stockpile. The 
NNSA has been rife with cost overruns – in the case of the Mixed Oxide 
Fuel Fabrication Facility in South Carolina, costs skyrocketed from initial 
2002 estimates of $1 billion to $7.8 billion, more than a 7-fold increase 
(Pickrell, 1990). 
Environmental cleanup is the second largest component of the DOE’s 
budget, widely known as ‚the legacy of waste created by federal nuclear 
weapons sites in the decades following World War II‛ and reformed only 
after a series of damaging reports during the 1980s (Pickrell, 1990). 
Taxpayers have funded over $150 billion to clean up the government’s 
nuclear messes since 1990, yet the GAO found that the DOE’s attempts to 
treat and dispose of waste has been plagued with false starts and failures, 
resulting in steadily growing estimates of the program’s total cost.‛ 
(Pickrell, 1990). According to a 2008 report, the GAO found that nine out of 
10 cleanup projects resulted in cost escalations and schedule delays, 
ranging from overruns of $139 million to over $9 billion and delays of two 
to 15 years.  
This pattern of cost overruns, schedule delays, and project 
mismanagement is evident in examples under administrations across the 
political spectrum. Table 4 includes examples of major energy projects and 
their respective costs: 
 
Table 4. Sampling of energy cost overruns 
Energy Projects 
 
 Cost Estimate and Date of Estimate 
Original   Recent/Final  Cost Overrun   
Hanford nuclear waste site $4.3b (2000)   $13.4b (2012)  $9.1b   
Superconducting Supercollider $4.4b (1987)   $11.8b (1993)  $7.4b   
NNSA-Savannah River $1.0b (2002)   $7.8b (2014)  $6.8b   
National Ignition Facility $2.1b (1995)   $5.3b (2014)  $3.2b   
Clinch River Breeder Reactor $400m (1971)   $4.0b (1983)  $3.6b   
FutureGen clean coal project $950m (2003)   $1.8b (2008)  $850m 
 
Source: Edwards, & Kaeding, (2015). Prepared by Alexandria Edwards, the Johns Hopkins University. 
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3. Literature review: Megaprojects & cost overruns as a 
global phenomenon 
3.1. The ‚Megaproject paradox‛ 
This pattern of pervasive cost overruns and mismanagement is evident 
in projects worldwide. Globally, countries are faced with ‚a new political 
and physical animal: the multibillion-dollar mega infrastructure project.‛ 
(Flyvbjerg, 2003). The growth of megaprojects has amplified the impacts of 
pervasive cost overruns. The term megaproject generally refers to complex 
ventures that cost $1 billion or more, take many years to develop, involve 
multiple stakeholders, and impact millions of people (McKinsey Global 
Institute. [Retrieved from]). These multibillion dollar projects largely 
operate by an ‚iron law‛ – over budget, over time, over and over again. 
Oxford economist Bent Flyvbjerg is the world’s most cited scholar in the 
field of megaproject planning and management, and his work focuses on 
deceptive and inaccurate cost estimations in infrastructure project 
planning. He has written extensively about such ‚Machiavellian projects,‛ 
using project-level data to support the notion of systematic bias toward 
projects with cost overruns and benefit shortfalls in project planning. 
Megaprojects are not only growing in size, but they are also being built 
in far greater numbers than ever before. Despite the apparent attractiveness 
of megaprojects, many of them have strikingly poor performance. 
Policymakers often fail to consider many factors, including the inherent 
riskiness, planning biases, and inaccuracies in cost, schedule, and benefit 
estimations. Table 5 illustrates the dismal history of cost overrun in large 
scale projects. 
 
Table 5. Large-scale projects have a calamitous history of cost overrun 
Project Cost Overrun (%) 
Suez Canal, Egypt 1,900 
Scottish Parliament Building, Scotland 1,600 
Sydney Opera House, Australia 1,400 
Montreal Summer Olympics, Canada 1,300 
Concorde supersonic airplane, UK, France 1,100 
Troy and Greenfield railroad, USA 900 
Excalibur Smart Projectile, USA, Sweden 650 
Canadian Firearms Registry, Canada 590 
Lake Placid Winter Olympics, USA 560 
Medicare transaction system, USA 560 
National Health Service IT system, UK 550 
Bank of Norway headquarters, Norway 440 
Furka base tunnel, Switzerland 300 
Verrazano Narrows Bridge, USA 280 
Boston's Big Dig artery/tunnel project, USA 220 
Denver international airport, USA 200 
Panama Canal, Panama 200 
Minneapolis Hiawatha light rail line, USA 190 
Humber bridge, UK 180 
Dublin Port tunnel, Ireland 160 
Montreal metro Laval extension, Canada 160 
Copenhagen metro, Denmark 150 
Boston-New York-Washington railway, USA 130 
Great Belt rail tunnel, Denmark 120 
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London Limehouse road tunnel, UK 110 
Brooklyn bridge, USA 100 
ShinkansenJoetsu high-speed rail line, Japan 100 
Channel tunnel, UK, France 80 
Karlsruhe-Bretten light rail, Germany 80 
London Jubilee line extension, UK 80 
Bangkok metro, Thailand 70 
Mexico City Metroline, Mexico 60 
High-speed Rail Line South, the Netherlands 60 
Great Belt East bridge, Denmark 50 
Source: Flyvbjerg, (2017). Prepared by Alexandria Edwards, the Johns Hopkins University. 
 
3.2. Deceptive cost estimation: Causes and empirical evidence 
Flyvbjerg, SkarmisHolm, and Buhl identified four major steps in the 
academic literature that aim to better understand the role of deceptive cost 
estimation and decision making in project planning, with a focus on 
transportation infrastructure. In the 1990s, Pickrell and Fouracre, Allport, 
and Thomson took the first step, and both studies found evidence of 
substantial cost underestimation based on a small number of urban railroad 
projects (Flyvbjerg, Holm, & Buhl, 2002). Secondly, Wachs supported these 
findings and found that ‚intentional deception‛ is a fundamental cause of 
cost underestimation, also based on a small sample of urban rail projects 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2002). However, this initial research was based on sample 
sizes too small to be statistically significant. Flyvbjerg et al., (2002) take the 
third step. By using a large sample of transportation infrastructure projects, 
they demonstrate: 
1. The pattern of cost underestimation first established by Pickrell, 
Fouracre et al., and others is generalizable and statically significant. 
2. This pattern of cost underestimation holds across different project 
types, geographical regions, and historical periods (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002). 
Moreover, they show that the large-sample pattern lends statistical 
support to Wachs’ claim about deceptive cost underestimation in his 
smaller-sample study. 
The fourth and final step in fully understanding cost underestimation 
would be to apply Wachs’ analysis to a large sample of different 
transportation infrastructure projects to establish whether systematic 
deception actually takes place (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002). This has not been 
conclusively established yet and is a topic for further research.  
Flyvbjerg’s (2002) study established a foundation for further research 
into cost inaccuracies in project planning, and his database has been 
referenced in numerous subsequent works. In accordance with 
international convention, they measure inaccurate cost estimates as ‚cost 
escalation‛ or ‚cost overrun,‛ or actual costs minus estimated costs as a 
percentage of estimated costs (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002). Additionally, they 
define estimated costs as those assessed at the time of the decision to build 
rather than a later stage in project development, as this method most 
accurately reflects the costs considered in the initial decision making 
process. 
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Using a sample of 258 transportation infrastructure projects worth $90 
billion, representing diverse project types, regions, and historical periods, 
Flyvbjerg et al. found that cost estimates are ‚highly and systematically 
misleading.‛ (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002). 
3.2.1. Inaccuracy of cost estimates 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of inaccuracies of cost estimates. In 
almost 9 out of 10 projects, costs are underestimated. For any randomly 
selected project, there is an 86% chance that actual costs will exceed 
estimated costs, while the likelihood of actual costs being lower or equal to 
estimates is only 14%. Estimated costs are systematically underestimated, 




Figure 1. Inaccuracy of cost estimates in 258 transportation infrastructure projects (fixed 
prices) 
Source: Flyvbjerg, Skamris. & Buhl, (2002). 
 
3.2.2. Cost underestimation by project type  
Three main project types were studied: rail projects (high speed, urban, 
and conventional inner-city rail), fixed-link projects (bridges and tunnels), 
and roads. Table 5 depicts the average expected cost inaccuracies and 
standard deviation by project type. The data show that rail projects incur 
the highest cost overruns with an average of 44.7%, followed by fixed link 
projects at 33.8% and roads at 20.4%. Project type has a statistically 
significant effect on percentage cost escalation. 
 
Table 6. Inaccuracy of transportation cost estimates by project type (fixed prices) 
Project type 
Number of cases 
(N) 




Level of significance 
(p) 
Rail 58 44.7 38.4 <0.001 
Fixed link  33 33.8 62.4 <0.004 
Road 167 20.4 29.9 <0.001 
All projects 91 27.6 38.7 <0.001 
Source: Flyvbjerg, Holm, & Buhl, (2002). Prepared by Alexandria Edwards, the Johns Hopkins 
University. 
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Figure 2. Inaccuracy of cost estimates in rail, fixed-link, and road projects (fixed prices) 
Source: Flyvbjerg, Holm, & Buhl, (2002) 
 
3.2.3. Cost underestimation by geographical location  
Table 7 shows differences between actual and estimated costs for 
projects in Europe, North America, and ‚other geographical areas,‛ 
including 10 developing nations plus Japan. Highly significant differences 
were found in countries from ‚other geographical areas,‛ as the average 
cost escalation was 64.6%. 
 



































          
Rail 23 34.2 25.1 19 40.8 36.8 16 64.6 49.5 
Fixed link  15 43.4 52 18 25.7 70.5 0 - - 
Road 143 22.4 24.9 24 8.4 49.4 0 - - 
All projects 181 25.7 28.7 61 23.6 54.2 16 64.6 49.5 
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3.2.4. Cost underestimation over time  
If cost underestimation were unintentional and primarily a result of 
inexperience or faulty methods in forecasting costs, it would follow that 
cost underestimation would decrease over time as new and better methods 
were developed and additional experience was gained in planning and 
implementation. However, data show that cost underestimation has not 
decreased over this period and is in the ‚same order of magnitude as it was 
10, 30, and 70 years ago. No learning seems to take place in this important 
and highly costly sector of public and private decision making.‛ (Flyvbjerg, 
Skamris. & Buhl, 2002). 
 
 
Figure 3. Inaccuracy of cost estimates in transportation projects over time, 1910-1998 
(fixed prices, 111 projects) 
Source: Flyvbjerg, Holm, & Buhl, (2002) 
 
3.3. Geographic variation and project cost performance  
Cantarelli, Flyvbjerg, & Buhl (2002) further studied the role of 
geographical location in cost performance and built upon Flyvbjerg’s initial 
2002 dataset. While cost overruns occur globally, the magnitude of 
overruns varies with location. The study discussed Boston’s Central Artery 
project, the complex underground highway project known as the ‚Big 
Dig,‛ which had cost overrun of 275%. Another famous project disaster is 
the United Kingdom’s Channel Tunnel, resulting in 80% higher than 
forecasted construction costs. Despite being a global phenomenon, very 
few studies comparing actual and estimated costs have accounted for 
geographical location (Cantarelli, Flyvbjerg, & Buhl, 2012). 
Numerous studies have focused on overruns in individual countries, 
and an overview of the current literature is included in Table 8. All these 
studies affirm that cost overruns are more common than under runs, 
however, the magnitude of overruns differs among the studies. According 
to Cantarelli et al., the main reason for the differences in average cost 
overrun is the difference in the use of nominal and real prices. 
Additionally, the use of different baselines for cost estimations, sample 
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sizes, and geography contribute to the variation (Cantarelli, Flyvbjerg, & 
Buhl, 2012). 
 
Table 8. Frequency and Magnitude of Cost Overruns Found in Literature 
Study Geographical area 
Frequency 
cost overrun 










% N % N % N % N 
Merewitz (1973) US 79 26 49 54 17 
    Morris (1990) India 




Pickrell (1990, 1992) US 88 
  
61 8 
    Auditor General (1994) Sweden 
 
86 8 17 7 
    Nijkamp and Ubbels (1999) Netherlands, Finland 75 
      
0-20 8 
Bordat et al. (2004)  US 55 5 2,668 
      Odeck (2004) Norway 52 8 620 
      Dantata et al. (2006) US 81 
  
30 16 
    Ellis et al. (2007) US 
 
9 3,130 
      Lee (2008) South Korea 95 11 138 48 16 
    Flyvbjerg et al. (2003a) World 86 20 167 41 58 34 33 
  Prepared by Alexandria Edwards, The Johns Hopkins University. 
Source: Cantarelli, Flyvbjerg, & Buhl, (2012). 
 
3.3.1. Cost overruns in 806 projects compared with previous data 
Cantarelli et al. (2012) also aimed to assess whether and to what extent 
cost performance in the enlarged global dataset differed from the data 
included in Flyvbjerg’s original dataset of 258 projects (Flyvbjerg, Holm, & 
Buhl, 2002). The enlarged database of 806 projects differs from the original 
in three aspects: 
1. Projects from three new regions are included: South Europe, East 
Europe and Africa. 
2. Asian projects are better represented in the larger database. 
3. The number of projects for all three project types has been greatly 
increased (Flyvbjerg, Holm, & Buhl, 2002). 
Table 9 presents projects per region and project type for both databases, 
and Table 10 represents the number of projects, mean cost overrun, and 
standard deviation for both samples. 
 
Table 9. Number of projects (#) per region and project type in the database with 806 and 
258 projects. 
Worldwide database (N = 806)            Worldwide database (N = 258) 
Region # Road # Rail # Tunnel # Bridge #Total # Road # Rail # Fixed Link # Total 
NW EU 315 90 32 22 459 143 23 15 181 
S EU 16 7 – – 23 – – – 0 
E EU 37 – – – 37 – – – 0 
N Am 24 65 3 16 108 24 19 18 61 
L Am – 1 – – 1 – 1 – 1 
Asia 138 20 1 – 159 0 3 0 3 
Africa 7 – – – 7 – – – 0 
Other – 12 – – 12 – 12 – 12 
Total 537 195 36 38 806 167 58 33 258 
Prepared by Alexandria Edwards, The Johns Hopkins University. 
Source: Cantarelli, Flyvbjerg, & Buhl  (2012). 
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Table 10. Cost overruns (%) broken down by project type for worldwide samples (N = 
806) and (N = 258). 
Project type 
Worldwide N = 806 Worldwide N = 258 
N Mean (%) SD N Mean (%) SD 
Road 537 19.8 31.4 167 20.4 29.9 
Rail 195 34.1 43.5 58 44.7 38.4 
Fixed Links 74 32.8 58.2 33 33.8 62.4 
Bridges 38 30.3 60.6 n/a n/a n/a 
Tunnels 36 35.5 56.3 n/a n/a n/a 
Prepared by Alexandria Edwards, The Johns Hopkins University 
Source: Cantarelli, Flyvbjerg, & Buhl, (2012).  
 
Of the project types, road projects have the smallest overrun of 20%, 
followed by bridge projects with 30%, rail projects with 34%, and tunnel 
projects with an overrun of 35%; the authors conclude, with overwhelming 
statistical significance, that cost performance differs among project types. 
Comparing the enlarged dataset with the original, two figures are notable: 
the considerably lower average cost overrun for rail projects and the hardly 
changed cost overrun for road projects. This suggests that geographical 
location had a larger influence on cost overrun for rail projects than for 
road projects, which can be explained by the addition of projects in Europe 
and North America that generally have a better cost performance record.  
 
3.4. Evaluating the ‚China Myth‛ 
China’s infrastructure program illustrates the accelerated pace at which 
nations are investing in megaprojects. For example, from 2004-2008, China 
spent more on infrastructure than it did during the entire twentieth 
century, increasing the spending rate by a factor of twenty (Ansar, 
Flyvbjerg, & Budzier, 2016). Additionally, China built as many kilometers 
of high-speed rail from 2005-2008 as Europe did in twenty years. 
China’s investment boom has coincided with considerable accumulation 
in debt, as shown in Figure 6. Total debt increased by $26.1 trillion from 
2000 to 2014, with total capital investment increasing $29.1 trillion; the vast 
majority of Chinese investments since 2008 have been debt fueled (Ansar, 
Flyvbjerg, & Budzier, 2016). Accounting for the fact that many corporations 
and financial institutions in China are state-owned, China’s implicit 
government debt as percentage of GDP indicates that it is the second-most 
indebted government in the world (Ansar, Flyvbjerg, & Budzier, 2016). 
Ansar, Flyvbjerg, & Budzier (2016) conducted an ex-post study of 
infrastructure investments in China, where substantial economic growth 
has occurred in tandem with a sprawling infrastructure program. Using a 
large sample of investments, the authors sought to understand whether 
each of the projects generated economic value, quantified as a benefit-to-
cost-ratio greater than 1.0. They studied 95 road and rail projects built from 
1984 to 2008 spanning 19 (out of 22) provinces, all four municipalities, and 
four out of five autonomous regions, constituting the largest dataset of its 
kind on China’s infrastructure (Ansar, Flyvbjerg, & Budzier, 2016). The 
primary measures used by the authors were cost performance (defined as 
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underrun or overrun, expressed as a ratio of cost estimates), schedule 
performance (measured as a ratio of actual implementation period to 
estimated implementation period), and benefits performance (measured as 
forecasted vs. actualized traffic).  
The evidence presents a dismal picture of the outcomes of major 
transport projects in China. While the typical predicted benefit-to-cost-ratio 
was approximately 1.4-1.5, indicating that planners expected net present 
benefits would exceed net present costs by 40-50%, the evidence suggests 
that over half of the infrastructure investments in China have actually been 
NPV negative over the past 30 years (Ansar, Flyvbjerg, & Budzier, 2016). 
Rather than driving economic growth, the typical infrastructure project has 
destroyed economic value.  
 
 
Figure 4. Proportions of projects by ex post estimates of BCRs (n=65) 
Source: Ansar, Flyvbjerg, & Budzier, (2016). 
 
 
Figure 5. Density trace of cost overruns in constant RMB by project type and mean 
(vertical lines) – road (n=74) and rail (n=21) 
Source: Ansar, Flyvbjerg, & Budzier, (2016). 
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Figure 6. Density trace of schedule overruns by project type and mean (vertical lines) – 
road (n=74) and rail (n=21) 
Source: Ansar, Flyvbjerg, & Budzier, (2016). 
 
 
Figure 7. Density trace of benefit shortfall or excess (%) by project type and mean (vertical 
lines) – road (n=137) and rail (n=19) 
Source: Ansar, Flyvbjerg, & Budzier, (2016). 
 
While many assert that China’s massive infrastructure programs explain 
its high growth rate, Ansar et al. and others argue that this is a 
fundamentally flawed interpretation. China’s stellar economic performance 
during the 1980s preceded its infrastructure programs. The so-called ‘China 
miracle’ occurred ‚not because it had glittering skyscrapers and modern 
highways, but because bold liberalization and institutional reforms created 
competition and nurtured private entrepreneurship.‛ (Huang, 2006).  
Ansar et al., (2016) challenge neo-Keynesian interpretations of the role of 
infrastructure spending, asserting that China’s investment boom and poor 
project level outcomes have had pernicious macroeconomic implications. 
The consequences of over-investment in underperforming projects are 
amplified by the accumulation of ‚destabilizing piles of debt<and 
unprecedented monetary expansion,‛ which has also created heightened 
economic fragility to financial crises (Ansar, Flyvbjerg, & Budzier, 2016). 
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3.5. The fallacy of beneficial ignorance – rejecting Hirschman’s 
hiding hand 
An influential principle in project planning is Albert O. Hirschman’s 
principle of the ‚Hiding Hand,‛ initially published in 1967. This principle 
is clearly expressed by former Speaker of the California State Assembly and 
Mayor of San Francisco in comments regarding the city’s Transbay 
Terminal megaproject, a multi-billion dollar scheme that incurred 
substantial cost overruns: ‚If people knew the real cost from the start, 
nothing would ever be approved. The idea is to get going. Start 
digging.‛(Flyvbjerg, 2016). Hirschman’s principle was first published over 
50 years ago; the theory remains extremely influential in academics and 
policymaking. As the world is currently experiencing the ‚biggest 
investment boom in history‛ with project portfolios growing rapidly 
worldwide, this politically convenient explanation is becoming even more 
consequential‛(Flyvbjerg, 2016). 
Flyvbjerg conducted the first statistical test of this principle, which 
ultimately rejected the theory at a high level of significance. Moreover, his 
study found that in reality, the exact opposite outcomes occur – rather than 
obtaining project success with cost overruns outweighed by higher than 
estimate benefits, the average project is ‚undermined by a double 
whammy‛ of cost overruns and benefit shortfalls‛(Flyvbjerg, 2016). 
Flyvbjerg (2016) notes that Hirschman’s ideas are based on an ‚exceedingly 
small number of observations and biased data,‛ citing merely 11 
development projects spread over four continents (Flyvbjerg, 2016). This 
fact is often obscured in the secondary literature referring to this principle, 
giving a false sense of strong empirical foundations. Additionally, 
Hirschman’s study is based on biased data collection. Hirschman’s own 
notes indicate that despite the fact that project managers conveyed ‚that 
their projects had ‘failed,’‛ he ‚tended to be more hopeful than his 
witnesses.‛ (Flyvbjerg, 2016). While such optimism could be reasonable, the 
data were never systematically problematized or tested for validity, and the 
nature of the data collection was generally concealed (Flyvbjerg, 2016). 
Ultimately, the concept of the Hiding Hand was overextended as a 
generalizable principle.  
Flyvbjerg conducted a statistical test on a dataset consisting of 2,062 
projects in an attempt to replicate Hirschman’s results with a greater 
sample, which constitutes the largest dataset of its kind. The data cover 
eight project types, 104 countries on six continents (including developed 
and developing nations), and a time period from 1927 to 2018 (Flyvbjerg, 
2016). Each project was measured for cost overrun and benefit overrun. 
These data are difficult to come by, as no statistical agency or data service 
exists to obtain such information. As a result, the data were mined data 
point by data point directly from the source; the current dataset was 
compiled over 20 years. Data were obtained from various sources, 
including annual project accounts, cost and procurement accounts, revenue 
accounts, auditors’ data, questionnaires, interviews, and other studies. 
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Additionally, some data were rejected due to insufficient data quality, so 
this study includes all projects for which data were deemed valid and 
reliable. 
Flyvbjerg refutes Hirschman’s main claim that higher than estimate 
project costs/difficulties are typically outweighed by even higher-than-
estimated project benefits/problem solving abilities. While ideal data would 
measure the complete life cycle of projects, such data are rarely available. 
As a result, international convention is to measure costs by the proxy of 
construction costs and benefits by the proxy of first year benefits, and this 
convention is used in Flyvbjerg’s test (Flyvbjerg, 2016). Cost overrun is 
measured as actual divided by estimated costs in real terms, and benefit 
overruns is measured by the actual divided by estimated usage (e.g., traffic 
for transportation infrastructure and power generation for energy 
infrastructure). For both cases, the baseline for determining overrun is 
calculated at the date of decision to build. 
 
Table 11.  Are higher than estimated costs outweighed by even higher-than-estimated 
benefits, as the Hiding Hand claims? 
(Cost and benefit overruns measured as actual divided by estimated costs and benefits [A/E], in real terms) 
Project Type                Cost Overruns            Benefit Overruns   
  N Average cost overrun (A/E) N Average benefit overrun (A/E) p* 
Dams 243 1.96 84 0.89 <0.0001 
Bus Rapid Transit 6 1.41 4 0.42 0.007 
Rail 264 1.4 74 0.66 <0.0001 
Tunnels  48 1.36 23 0.81 0.015 
Power Plants  100 1.36 23 0.94 0.0003 
Buildings  24 1.36 20 0.99 0.01 
Bridges  49 1.32 26 0.96 <0.0001 
Roads 869 1.24 532 0.96 <0.0001 
Total 1603 1.39/1.43** 786 0.9/0.83** <0.0001 
Notes: * The p-value of the test with the null hypothesis that benefit overrun is larger than cost overrun, 
using Mann-Whitney test. **Weighted and unweighted average, respectively. 
Source: Flyvbjerg (2016). 
 
If Hirschman’s principle were correct, average benefit overruns would 
exceed average cost overruns – this is not the case for any of the eight 
project types in Table 1. Moreover, there is no benefit overrun at all – in 
fact, Flyvbjerg found an average benefit shortfall (benefit overrun <1). 
Rather than developing projects that generate benefits compensating for 
cost overruns, as theorized in Hirschman’s ‚two offsetting 
underestimates,‛ the average project is ‚impaired by a twofold blow of 
substantial cost overruns compounded by substantial benefit shortfalls.‛ 
(Flyvbjerg, 2016). Not only is this pattern bad for general viability at the 
project level, but just one major project gone awry can have detrimental 
impacts on fragile national economies. 
 
3.6. Costs of hydropower megaproject development 
A growing area of megaproject development includes hydropower 
dams. In light of this ‚brisk building boom of hydropower mega-dams‛ 
worldwide, Ansar et al. investigated ex post outcomes of schedule and cost 
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estimates (Ansar, Flyvbjerg, Budzier, & Lunn, 2014). The authors found 
overwhelming evidence that budgets are systematically biased below 
actual costs, yet in most countries, large hydropower dams will be too 
costly and take too long to build to deliver positive risk-adjusted returns 
without appropriate risk management measures. Proponents of large dams 
cite numerous benefits – reduced use of fossil fuels, flood control, urban 
water supply, and job creation, among others. Thus, there has been a 
‚robust pipeline of new mega-dams‛ of unprecedented scale being 
developed globally after a two-decade lull (Ansar, et al., 2014). Despite 
these purported benefits, large dams are controversial because they entail 
substantial financial costs, as well as profound environmental, ecological, 
and social impacts.  
Furthermore, these projects are so large in scale that even for an 
economy as large as China’s, the ‚negative economic ramifications could 
likely hinder the economic viability of the country as a whole‛ if risks are 
not adequately managed (Ansar, et al., 2014). Increasingly, evidence in civil 
society, academia, and institutional accounts has suggested that large dams 
have ‚strikingly poor performance record in terms of economic, social and 
environmental impact, and public support.‛ Ansar et al., (2014) aim to 
answer the question: should we build more large hydropower dams?   
Ansar et al., (2014) conducted an investigation and multilevel regression 
analysis centered on the magnitude and frequency of inaccuracies between 
managers’ forecasts and actual outcomes related to cost overrun and 
schedule overrun. The authors used multilevel regression models in order 
to address the fact that outcomes of dam projects may exhibit within-
country country correlations. Using data from 245 large dams and 36 
potential explanatory variables, Ansar et al. made the following 
observations: (Ansar, et al., 2014). 
1. Three out of every four large dams suffered cost overrun in constant 
local currency terms. 
2. Actual costs, on average, were 96% higher than estimated costs, 
with a median of 27%. The evidence overwhelmingly supports a systematic 
bias toward cost underestimation; the magnitude of cost overrun is higher 
than the error of cost overestimation. 
3. As depicted in Figure 8, Graphing cost overrun reveals a fat tail, 
implying that planners have difficulty in computing probabilities of events 
far into the future. Actual costs more than double for two out of every ten 
large dams, and more than triple for one out of every ten dams. 
4. As depicted in Figure 9, large dams in every region of the world 
suffer systematic cost overrun. Large dams build in North America (N=40) 
have considerably lower average cost overrun (11%) than dams build 
elsewhere (104%). After controlling for covariates such as project scale in a 
multilevel model, Ansar et al. have found that differences among regions 
are not significant. One potential explanation may be that 3 out of 4 dams 
in this study were advised by North American firms, and as a result, an 
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‚overreliance on North American experience‛ may bias cost estimates 
downwards in the rest of the world.  
5. The typical projected benefit-to-cost ratio was 1.4; planners expected 
net present benefits to exceed net present costs by 40%. Nearly half of the 
dams suffered actual cost overrun of 1.4 or greater. 
6. The authors studied whether forecasting errors differ by project 
type (e.g., hydropower, irrigation, or multipurpose dam) or wall type. They 
found no statistically significant differences. 
7. After analyzing whether cost estimates have increased accuracy 
over time, Ansar et al. found that irrespective of the year or decade in 
which a dam is built, there are no significant differences in forecasting 
errors (Figure 2). Additionally, there is no linear trend suggesting 
improvement or deteriorating forecasts over time; there is little learning 
from prior mistakes.   
8. Eight out of every 10 large dams suffered schedule overrun. 
9. Actual implementation schedule, on average, exceeded the estimate 
by 44%, with a median of 27%, shown in Figure 11. Evidence 
overwhelmingly suggests that implementation schedules are systematically 
biased toward underestimation, like cost overruns; the magnitude of 
schedule underestimation is larger than the error of schedule 
overestimation. 
10. Costs are at a higher risk of ‚spiraling out of control‛ than 
schedules. While graphing schedule overruns also reveals a fat tail as 
shown in Figure 11, it is not as fat as the tail of cost overruns. 
11. There is less regional variation in schedule overruns than cost 
overruns; large dams built everywhere take significantly longer than 
forecasted.  
12. There is no evidence indicating that schedule estimates have 
improved over time. 
 
 
Figure 8. Density trace of actual/estimated cost (i.e. costs overruns) in constant local 
currency terms with the median and mean (N=245). 
Source: Ansar, et al., (2014). 
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Figure 9. Location of large dams in the sample and cost overruns by geography. 
Source: Ansar, et al., (2014). 
 
 
Figure 10. Inaccuracy of cost estimates (local currencies, constant prices) for large dams 
over time (N=245), 1934–2007. 
Source: Ansar, et al., (2014). 
 
 
Figure 11. Inaccuracy of schedule estimates (local currencies, constant prices) for large 
dams over time (N=245), 1934–2007. 
Source: Ansar, et al., (2014). 
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In light of these observations and analysis of numerous qualitative case 
examples, Ansar et al. put forth four policy propositions to avert 
substantial cost and schedule overruns:  
1. Energy alternatives that rely on fewer site-specific characteristics, such as 
unfavorable geology, are preferable. 
In projects around the world, experts’ optimism regarding numerous 
risk factors exacerbate cost overruns in large dams. The planning 
documents for Brazil’s Itumbiara hydroelectric project demonstrate this. 
Despite recognizing that the site chosen was geologically unfavorable, the 
plan optimistically provided 20% of base cost for physical contingencies; in 
reality, weak geology resulted in costs of 96% of the base cost, in real terms 
(Ansar, et al., 2014). 
2. Energy alternatives that rely on fewer imports or match the currency of 
liabilities with the currency of future revenue are preferable.  
Planners of Colombia’s Chivor hydroelectric project were optimistic that 
the exchange rate between the Colombian Peso and the US dollar would 
not change during the project’s seven-year construction period (1970-1977), 
providing no allowance for potential future exchange rate fluctuations. In 
reality, the Colombian peso depreciated nearly 90% against the US dollar, 
resulting in a 32% cost overrun in real Colombian peso terms. Currency 
exposure is a consistent ‚fiscal hemorrhage‛ for large projects (Ansar, et al., 
2014). 
3. The best insurance against creeping inflation is to reduce the 
implementation schedule to as short a horizon as possible. Energy alternatives that 
can be built sooner and with lower risk of schedule overruns, e.g. through modular 
design, are preferable. 
Following convention, Ansar et al.’s analysis excludes effects of 
inflation. However, planners must consider the risks of unanticipated 
inflation – episodes of hyperinflation in Argentina, Brazil, Turkey, and 
Yugoslavia resulted in ‚staggering nominal cost overruns‛ of up to 110-
times the initial budget (as seen in Yugoslavia’s Visegrad dam from 1985-
1990), which had to be financed with additional debt (Ansar, et al., 2014). 
These effects are magnified by long project completion periods.  
4. Energy alternatives that do not constitute a large proportion of the balance 
sheet of a country or a company are preferable. Similarly, policymakers, 
particularly in countries at lower levels of economic development, ought to avoid 
highly leveraged investments denominated in a mix of currencies. 
Large dams are generally financed by public borrowing. Cost overruns 
increase nations’ stock of debt, as well as recurring financing costs that 
escalate if interest rates increase. For instance, the Tarbela dam amounted 
to 23% of the increase in Pakistan’s external public debt from 1968 to 1984 
(Ansar, et al., 2014). Ultimately, major projects entail uncontrollable risks 
which cannot adequately hedged, even when anticipated.  
Before making any investment in a project, policymakers should refer to 
a valid and reliable ‚outside view, or reference class forecast (RCF) that can 
predict the outcome of a planned investment‛ based on actual historical 
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outcomes in a reference class of similar, previously completed cases 
(Flyvbjerg, 2008). The application of RCF techniques to energy investments, 
as well as infrastructure more broadly, will enhance transparency of risk 
profiles of various alternatives on the basis of not only financial costs and 
benefits, but also environmental and social impacts, and improve resource 
allocation through an ‚outside-in view to estimate costs, benefits, time, and 
broader impacts‛ while mitigating the effects of optimism bias and 
strategic misrepresentation (Flyvbjerg, 2008). Ideally, a comprehensive 




Governments around the globe are pouring billionsin to massive public 
works projects in a seemingly bipartisan consensus, and politicians across 
the political spectrum have called for unprecedented levels of public 
spending on infrastructure and other government projects. However, 
policymakers have failed to consider the fact that despite massive 
spending, project performance is systematically substandard, often 
threatening the financial viability of these initiatives and eroding, rather 
than creating value for taxpayers. Lacking comprehensive, ex-post cost-
benefit analysis, political and bureaucratic motivations distort the decision-
making process regarding major projects. Moreover, overinvestment in 
underperforming projects, especially when compounded by high levels of 
debt, can result in systemic fragility. The sheer size of megaprojects is also 
concerning. If they were nations, projects of this size would rank among the 
world’s top 100 countries based on GDP; when such massive projects fail, 
there are substantial economic implications. The private sector profit and 
loss system of accountability and incentive alignment is lacking in most 
aspects of government investment, and this is abundantly clear in the 
infrastructure story. Rather than a system of purely economic calculations, 
bureaucratic management is ‚dependent on definite detailed rules and 
regulations‛ and often skewed by political interests (Mises, 1951). 
As the economy grapples with recession in the wake of the Covid-19 
pandemic, governments worldwide have spentup wards of $8 trillion in 
fiscal stimulus and adopted unprecedented monetary policy measures. 
There have been bipartisan calls fora major infrastructure program as part 
of the next stimulus plan, on top of the roughly $2 trillional located thus 
far. House Democrats have proposed a sprawling $1.5 trillion 
‚infrastructure‛ plan covering everything from roads to education, 
housing, clean water, broadband, and other largely unrelated items (Wolfe, 
2020). Policy makers should carefully consider projects on the basis of 
economic needs and look to policies that allow the private sector to drive 
growth, rather than waste trillions of taxpayer dollars on projects plagued 
by cost overruns and bureaucratic mismanagement. 
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